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On a sequential Boolean lattice.
We introduce into a boolean lattice B a monadic operator a which satisfies the following axioms: (i) ca is weakly productive; (ii) there is a recursive function g(x) such that for every number i, if con = 0 then g(i) E cc and if coi = N then g(i) + a; (iii) a is productive; (iv) the complement d of a is universal (i.e., every r.e. set is 1-1 reducible to d).
Let us say that a collection Z of re. sets is uniformly (many-one) reducible to a if there is recursive function f(x, y) such that for every number i for which coj E, the function fs (defined by the condition fi(x) = f(i, x)) is a many-one reduction of a)i to a. We show that a sufficient condition for a to be universal is that the collection of recursive sets is uniformly reducible to ac. From this it readily follows that a sufficient condition for an axiomatizable theory (T) to be creative is that all recursive sets be uniformly representable in ( 
ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS 317
Randomness is characterized by six axioms: R-1. If x is a random member of y with respect to z, relative to SY, SY is a rational set of statements. R-2. If x is a random member of y with respect to z, relative to SY, 'x E y' belongs to SY. R-3. If x is a random member of y with respect to z, relative to SY, and x' is a random member of y' with respect to z', relative to SY, and 'x c z' is connected by a biconditional chain to 'x' c z", then the strongest statement about y and z is just as strong as the strongest statement about y' and z'. R-4. If x is a random member of y with respect to z, relative to SY, then x is a random member of y with respect to z, relative to SY, then x is a random member of y with respect to 2, relative to SY. R-5. If x is a random member of y with respect to z, relative to SY, and x' is a random member of y' with respect to z', relative to SY, then (x; x') is a random member of the artesian product y x y', with respect to the artesian product z x z', relative to SY.
R-6. If x is a random member of y with respect to z, relative to SY, and x' is a random member of y' with respect to z', relative to SY, then (x; x') is a random member of y x y', with respect to x9(x c z v y s z'), relative to SY.
Probability is defined thus: The probability of a statement S, relative to the set of statements SY (which may represent a set of true or hypothetically true statements, or a rational corpus, or simply a set of statements) is the pair of numbers (p; q), if S is connected biconditionally to a statement of the form 'x s z'; if x is a random member of y, with respect to z, relative to SY, for some y; and if the strongest statistical statement in SY about y and z asserts that the proportion of y's that are z's falls in the closed interval [p, q].
Theorems analogous to the conventional rules for manipulating probabilities are proved on the basis of the above axioms; but I argue that there are sufficient grounds for rejecting axioms R-5 and R-6 as representing an intuitively acceptable notion of randomness. (Received October 30, I959.) 
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Probability and randomness, II. This is a specification of the preceding system, in which it is possible to define randomness explicitly, and in which all of the usual probability relationships are forthcoming. But it is too narrow to serve as a general explication for probability, even though it is broader than the usual frequency interpretation.
SYA is a rational set of statements ar' 4. The following axioms hold for SYA. Probability is defined in the manner of the previous system. Conditional probabilities are introduced in the obvious way: the probability of S, given T, relative to the set of statements about A, YA, is simply the probability of S relative to the set of statements YA supplemented by T, together with all of its consequences in V9A. On this basis the whole conventional probability calculus can be derived for statements of the form x E y, where y is one of the interesting subsets of A, and where x is, in any given context, always the same object.
In order to deal with statements like 'Xi C Y1 . x2 C Y2,' however, we need modify the system only to the extent of considering a rational set of statements about A2 in lieu of a rational set of statements about A; and in general a rational set of statements about An will suffice for most finitary probabilistic considerations. A non-writing non-erasing universal Turing machine with two blank tapes.
We consider Turing machines with single ended tapes and assume that the machines can sense the ends of their tapes. For an arbitrary (one-tape) such machine T we can construct a two-tape machine T* with this property: If the machine T, started at its tape origin with the binary number K written on its tape, stops eventually with the binary number T(K) written on its tape then the machine T*, if started with its first tape at its origin and the second tape at its 2K-th square, will stop with the second tape at this 2T(K)-th square.
The machine T* never changes the contents of its tapes which may as well be blank. 
